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- and NATO is seeking our agreement to identify the forces (450 Americans) and to authorize training in Germany. A subsequent decision by the NAC will be required, however, before the larger force deploys to Croatia. Shali believes the decision is many weeks
- would be in Croatia) is still an active option at NATO, Principals also agreed to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to agree to form the larger pr-epositioning force and to conduct training in Germany. The actual
- ; investigate all allegations of violations of agreement; "make appropriate recommendations". o Likely candidates for Implementation Commission membership: - U.K. - United States - o Russia Germany France EU Commission to provide r..cDmeD. ati.;.g
- a legal basis for possible NATO action in Kosovo'not requiring UN authorization (action: state .and USUN) . Principals agreed to continue accelerated NATO contingency planning; in that context, an assessment should be prepared, immediately considering
- , in particular, have strongly advocated that the West Europeans, NATO, and the UN use military force in Bosnia to expedite aid deliveries and to impose a settlement on the warring parties. Ankara, under domestic pressure to aid Rosnian Muilims helievesaUN-threat
1995-09-01B, BTF List re Balkan Crisis Chronology of International Response, Significant Events
(Item)
- financial obligations--in talks that had resumed on 8 December. 23 December Germany recognizes Slovenia and Croatia. 24 December Macedonia, Slovenia, -Croatia, and BosniaHercegovina apply to the EC for recognition as sovereign states. / 31 December UN
- of our assistance resources, recent experience indicates that this is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to ensure the consolidation of reform.) • Matching NATO SUDmit (and corresponding bilateral) initiatives that deepen cooperation with CEE
- NATO's role: Tactically, Russian leaders will want to increase Russian leverage and head off all domestic criticism by pressing for full sanctions relief for Serbia. Moscow has limited influence with Belgrade--and even less with Pale--but the Russians
- and need to remain in the region for years. 0 The Bosnian Government would welcome the direct intervention of NATO or other international forces in the conflict, provided the forces were intended to support the government's territorial and political goals
- agreed that this loosening of the noose around these cities is due in part to the threat of NATO airstrikes, but perhaps even more directly to the recent hopes of a peace settlement. The Bosnian Serbs have acquired the territory they set out to control
1995-05-01B, Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology Paper re Croatia Using the Gray Market
(Item)
- Western suppliers, particularly ammunition for its NATO-caliber artillery and small arms. - It supplements these purchases by taking roughly one-third of the arms transiting Croatia for the Bosnian Muslims Croatian officials-led by Assistant Minister
- degree of enforcement. General Powell: I agree the draft PDD is too pallid. more like a press statement than a decision document. would Madeleine suggest we do? Albright: It reads But what NATO action. Several speakers: I thought we had agreed that we
- as they press Washington to support their conflicting positions. Longstanding US allies, including Greece, Turkey, and Germany, could become entangled in this competition. Such allied disputes would almost certainly hamper US efforts to gain agreement on NATO's
- , precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. It will also accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner
- BE PREPARE'b TO ACKNOWLEDGE IF AND WHEN DIPLOMACY HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS. IN RECENT DAYS, NATO HAS TAKEN SEVERAL STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE TO MILOSEVIC THAT HIS ACTIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO COMPEL HIM TO CHANGE COURSE. WE DO NOT WISH TO USE
- hours per pilot, 165 hours a year less than that recommended for NATO pilots. Combat units rarely use their weapons in live fire exercises, and some tank crews reportedly fire only one round a year. Large scale exercises are almost never conducted
- This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material from the files of Robert Boorstin, NSC Speechwriter. Material includes a memo from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to President Clinton regarding an 1994 trip to Germany. Also included
- i a l element o f European s t a b i l i t y . Germany cannot c a s t o f f t h e burdens o f i t s h i s t o r y , b u t can - - i f encouraged by t h e U.S. and f i r m l y embedded i n t h e EU and NATO t o r e a s s u r e a l l i t s neighbors
- , and the British, in particular, would withdraw their forces if retaliation against them became too great. Germany would support enforcement, but not participate. 10 C05916707 S EIFT Enforcement of the No-Fly Ban remains a particularly delicate issue for.Moscow
- recommending adding to the State of the Union text two sentences on NATO expansion, CEE and Russia. The Administration" NATO/PFP initiatives show Presidential leadership and balance; they preempt Republican criticism (the previous Administration did nothing
- The President: Well, the people voted for you. That's the main thing. I wish you well and look forward to working with you. I guess I'll see you soon, at that NATO meeting, if not. sooner. Mr. Blair: Yes, that's right. I would love to do that. We have a chance
- l a r g e l y on European s e c u r i t y i n the run-up t o the Madrid NATO Summit i n July. There are two a l t e r n a t i v e scenarios f o r the t r i p . I f we succeed i n n e g o t i a t i n g a NATO-Russia agreement w i t h Moscow (and we
- from a major offensive. The threat of economic isolation is credible as long as the West presents a united front. In particular, clear warnings from Germany--a key economic partner-- already have helped dissuade Tudjman from pursuing military options
- f Germany (U) PARTICIPANTS: The President Chancellor Helmut Kohl Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony Gardner DATE, TIME AND PLACE: J u l y 13, 1995, 6:15-6:35 p.m. Oval O f f i c e The P r e s i d e n t : Chancellor Kohl: The P r e s i d
- h f o r c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n i n o b t a i n i n g I r a q ' s compliance w i t h a l l UNSC r e s o l u t i o n s . Exchange views on the broader i s s u e s o f European i n t e g r a t i o n , the f u t u r e o f NATO, and the American
- vessels suspected of violating sanctions. NATO and WEU forces in the Adriatic have stopped over 80 suspect ships since enforcement began; while a few violators have slipped through, there have been no further oil tanker deliveries to the port of Bar
- A u s t r i a , Canada, Germany, even the U.S., A u s t r a l i a , and elsewhere, refugees waiting to go back -- they cannot return to t h e i r homes i f the t e r r i t o r y remains c o n t r o l l e d by Serbs. This i s why Geneva broke down. f S
- ), CHINA (JIANG), TURKEY (DEMIREL), CANADA (CHRETIEN), GERMANY (SCHROEDER), UNSYG. IN ADDITION, CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH AND PRIME MINISTER BLAIR WILL RECEIVE PHONE CALLS FROM THE PRESIDENT. 6. 4Si- FOR A M N OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, BRUSSELS, M
- the Tunisians'readinessto deploy. The UN now anticipates deployment at the end of the month, claiming that they are awaiting USG-supplied equipment in Germany to arrive in Kigali. DOD will not move the equipment until we have formal legal assurances that the UN will accept
- we arrived in Mostar, we've got a firestorm on our hands with Izetbegovic, who isn't happy that we've stopped bombing. We deal with the cease-fire; he's ready for Sarajevo to have a few more 'days of shelling in return for NATO involvement. HILL: I
- E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PREL, NATO, EEC, ETRD, BE SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER DEHAENE AND FOREIGN MINISTER CLAES -- SCENESETTER REF: A) 93 BRUSSELS 14837; B) 93 BRUSSELS 13779 1
- SESSION OF THE BUNDESTAG, CALLED TO APPROVE GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN UN OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA RETROACTIVELY. 1,4c C i 2. EU: SHIFTING ATTENTION TO ASIA 1.4c //GERMANY PROBABLY WILL USE THE ASIA POLICY PAPER THAT THE COMMISSION RELEASED ON FRIDAY TO PUSH
- is trying to dominate the post-Cold War world. The UnitedStates and Germany, in their view, are using lowintensity conflict, political destabilization, Ground-based air defense training has been limited primarily to SA-6 units, which generally train
- Declassified Documents Concerning NATO Expansion
- This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings concerning NATO expansion from 1993 to 1999. Materials include correspondence to Russian President Boris Yeltsin
- Declassified Documents Concerning NATO Expansion
- This Mandatory Declassification Review contains material on Principals Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) meetings concerning NATO expansion from 1993 to 1999. Materials include a list of East European and CIS forces available
- 1995-05-12A, Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum re Proposed U.S. Policy Principals During NATO-led UNPROFOR Withdrawal
- C0 596 08 9 0" I10 nTA mi pproved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 11 N.l _ IdL5 _----- . 12 May 1995 07D/SCS PROPOSED US POLICY PRINCIPLES DURING NATO-LED UNPRQFOR WITHDRAWAL e NATO Mission. NATO's
- 1995-03-06, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re U.S. Participation in Step Two of NATO
- co 6031031 T WHITE HOUSE THE PRESIDENT1 jE HAS 3SEEN S WASHINGTON March 9, 1995 Approved for Release CIA Historical ollections Division AR 70-14 10CT201 Attached is a decision memo from Tony Lake on U.S. participation in NATO's "Step Two
- , other than France, are generally supportive of US views on the framework for a NATO-led withdrawal effort. They are anxious to ensure that UN and NATO withdrawal plans move forward while recognizing that a number of key issues, such as financing
- despite NATO's ceasefire ultimatum. Mr. Stephanopoulos noted CNN reports of preliminary indications of a Bosnian Serb pullback, which Mr. Lake said UNPROFOR General Rose believes to be the case. The President asked why, if the Bosnian Serbs intended
- of Bosnian peace accords. This includes complex civilian and -military structures. A nuniber of models are imaginable. following requirements: -- US interests include the Complete autonomy for NATO as the organizer of the IFOR. -- An indirect link
- C p efrees CIA Historical Collections Division AR 70-14 1OCT2013 POSITION PAPER Subject: Russian Participation in IFOR F "T/ p 1. 48) Purpose. To describe Joint Staff position regarding how Russian forces should participate in NATO's peace
- that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/U.S. ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain. Now is the time to review the fundamental principles guiding our policy and to determine the steps necessary to shape events
- complete command of their airspace in the near future, Bosnian Serb air defense forces probably will maintain a defensive posture--albeit at a heightened level of readiness--and not engage NATO aircraft except in situations where NATO aircraft are perceived
- 1460051662 PAGE July 20, 1994 RELEASED IN FULL NEW EXCLUS TON ZONES AND STRICT ENFORCEMENT The Contact Group agreed that if the Bosnian Serbs reject the proposed territorial settlement, NATO could impose Gorazde-type exclusion zones around the other.safe
- on the status of decisions concerning the OPLAN 40104 (withdrawal from Former Yugoslavia) approval process. Specifically, the next steps on NATO prepositioning -- Step 2. 2. -(C+ Key Points e While NATO supports a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the Former
- C059159980 Approved for Release CIA Historical Collectionsi ' Division AR 70-14 10CT2013 DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force 16 April 1994 Bosnian Serb Air Defense Threat in Gorazde Area The primary threat to NATO aircraft operating near Gorazde
- 1995-05-29, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Policy for Bosnia Use of U.S. Ground Forces to Support NATO Assistance for Redeployment of UNPROFOR within Bosnia
- Support NATO Assistance for Redeployment Forces to of UNPROFOR Within Bosnia Purpose To provide a summary of policy conclusions reached by Principals at their meeting on Bosnia on May 28, and obtain your decision on whether agreement in principle
- 1995-09-19, BTF Report re Impact of the NATO Air Campaign in Bosnia
- C059 616 0 4 pproved for Release CIA Historical Collections Division AR 7014 1OCT201 Intelligence Report (ua DCI InteragencyBalkan Task Force 19 September 1995 Impact of the NATO Air Campaign in Bosnia E O tLLI Steady battlefieldgainsby
1995-09-05A, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia September 5, 1995
(Item)
- Alice Rivlin Gordon Adams Summary of Conclusions 1. Principals met to review the status of the NATO airstrikes in response to the August 27 Bosnian Serb attack on the Sarajevo marketplace, progress of the U.S. diplomatic initiative
- of exaggerating the situation, now claim there is nothing the UN can do to protect the safe area without additional ground forces. The UN and our allies remain unwilling to use NATO air power more aggressively out of a fear of Serb retaliation against their troops
- for supporting NATO military action in Kosovo prepared by the USIA team. It is divided into two parts: (a) getting agreement of our allies to undertake military action and (b) enlisting mass and elite support before and after the action. You also asked
- This declassification review contains a September 1998 memo from the National Security Advisor to President Clinton regarding a NATO ultimatum and a March 1999 meeting memo on military options.
- that the time has come to back up international demands for a political solution and an end to violence against civilians with a credible threat of NATO military action. This would entail pressing NATO to issue an ultimatum demanding that Milosevic take concrete
- of a credible NATO military threat will continue to restrain the Bosnian Serbs, who want to avoid direct military engagement with the West. Strict enforcement of the exclusion zones using air power alone, however, would not force the Bosnian Serbs to accept
- Blair, covering topics of mutual interest such as NATO enlargement, Bosnia, terrorism, and trade. Also included are memcons with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, French President Jacques Chirac, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin.
- . ' it our reading of diplomatic reporting and public allied statements, We 2. in Bosni we believe such actions .would precipitate the following: Key NATO allies (including Britain, France, and Canada) would: " Consider unilateral actions as jeopardizing
- : * A coalition of forces on the Desert Storm model. A UN resolution would request "interested states and appropriate regional organizations" to undertake implementation. The coalition could be limited to the military implementation (which NATO would run
- not be limited to, the current situation within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, Bosnian Serb intentions and goals; humanitar'an relief situation; threats and anticipated reaction to effort to fly into Sarajevo without Serb authorization; Serb response to a NATO
- to deal with Serb attempts to control access to Sarajevo airport; and (3) NATO contingency planning for a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. Contact Group: Principals agreed that we should offer to suspend some additional sanctions if Milosevic
- current efforts would -remain in place: NATO air strike decisions and why? e the No-Fly-Zone? Any relief efforts? If so, how What military posture should a NATO or an allied coalition of the willing adopt to contain the fighting if withdrawal occurs
- in place. * Past experience with UN/NATO forces: Mladic's reactions to past NATO strikes suggest he may judge that he can outlast international willingness to pursue military action and that he can manipulate the allies and put them off with token actions
- should account for that. Also, you may want to participate in the discussion on the bottom-up review of strategy, particularly regarding possible reaction to a large NATO force in Bosnia/Croatia: Finally, you could raise some ke questions in any
- to options I and II only: Peace agreement would establish basic structure of military and civilian implementation. UNSC would endorse agreement and grant authority t'o NATO, UN agencies and other international institutions to implement t.. - Units
- Security Advisor Lake, was called to assess five options for expanded UN/NATO military activity in Bosnia aimed at avoiding further Serb gains against Gorazde and other safe areas. In addition to the DCI, other attendees included Secretary Christopher
- " of Sarajevo, which NATO and the UN have pledged to prevent. Therefore, Principals asked the Interagency Working Group to develop options for NATO action to reopen Sarajevo airport, together with a diplomatic strategy for gaining Allied and UN support
1995-05-18, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 19, 1995
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- that could see the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the introduction of NATO/US ground forces for a mission whose outcome is uncertain." The paper suggests that UNPROFOR is no longer able to perform its mandate and, under the circumstances, poses the question
- "worst.case" the situation: the Serbs, fearing NATO intervention, and the Bosnians, fearing abandonment, would obstruct withdrawal. Local units and civilians also would attempt to prevent a UN departure. 94-5 December 1994 fiSE Copy EA AT C05917080 UN
- Albright Summary of Conclusions 1. Principals discussed the recent increase in reports of violations of the no-fly zone. They recognized that investigations by the UN and NATO have been unable to confirm the reported activity. .Concerned that reporting
- . If Tudjman is prepared to agree to retaining the interpositional force in the separ.ation zone, Holbrooke may indicate a readiness to take th'is up with U.S. Allies, but without encouraging him to believe there is a significant likelihood of NATO assuming
1995-05-16, Department of State Paper re Bosnia Formulating a Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Strategy
(Item)
- , NATO has worked on the very narrow assumption that it will enter Bosnia, extract UNPROFOR, and leave. Even if this turns out to be the case, we cannot state with any degree of certainty what Bosnia will look like after UNPROFOR departs. Will the UN
- : Multilateral security assistance to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO force to implement the peace plan. Assumpions: (6) * Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved. * All parties to the conflict agree
- policy, we do not seem to be heading in that direction because of the real possibility of our helping UNPROFOR withdraw. Other goals mentioned include NATO cohesion and justice for Bosnia. Fuerth wondered whether this impacted on the decisions of what
- . Principals reviewed the status of OPLAN 40104 that covers NATO participation in VNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia. Noting that unanswered policy questions remain, they directed the IWG to develop a list of unanswered policy questions and answers relating
- crimes. 7. The Principals agreed that the US needs to prod NATO and the UN to become more aggressive in enforcing cease-fire violations in Sarajevo and Gorazde. They were informed that airstrikes could take place only in the event of the strangulation
1995-09-15, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia September 15, 1995
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- agreeing. 44-)- 5. Deputies noted their previous decision that non-NATO troops interested in participating would need to be integrated into IFOR under NATO operational control but deferred discussion of how that would be done.. They agreed that JCS
- on the status of U.S. and NATO planning for peace plan implementation. The NATO Military Authorities have been tasked to complete a draft OPLAN by the end of the -month. This will give a clearer sense of the overal-1 troop requirements -- although, even then, we
- relations and UN-NATO relations--have become more tense since the last meeting, in part because of the C05917058 NATO airstrikes against Udbina airfield and Serb air defense assets, and differences over the merits of additional airstrikes. We're
- , with flexibility to accept further compromises short of the full EU position. (Action: OVP/State) &S- 4. Principals reviewed the status of NATO military planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal.from Bosnia.and Croatia. They agreed that, while we should continue
- for an offensive in the Krajina. Also, you may want to participate in the discussion on the bottom-up review of strategy, particularly regarding possible reaction to a large NATO force in Bosnia/Croatia. CROATIAN STRATEGY 3. In recent weeks, State has taken
- 2. Deputies accepted as a working assumption (although this was disputed by some) that the force would largely be deployed to Federation territory. -8± 3. Deputies were in agreement that the mandate of the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (PIF
1995-05-01C, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum re Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport
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- Division AR 70-1410CT2013 Classified by Multiple Sources Declassify on OADR C059608 c-J * Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport. Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to 10 km from the airport. * NATO Airborne AC-130
- C05915997 Approved for Release CIA Historical ollections Division AR 70-14 110CT2013 DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force 15 April 1994 The Bosnian Serbs: Likely Next Steps Serb outrage over NATO air strikes appears to be evolving into a diplomatic
- intelligence at the prebrief. - Status of the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone. UN and NATO have announced that the Serbs have complied with the demand and in fact have withdrawn more equipment than the UN knew they had there--some 250 weapons. However, we believe
- liaison with IFOR but not be under NATO command. President Yelt'sin accepted this as a "minimum" package for Russian participation so long as Russian participation was not characterized as "supporting" or "secondary" forces. He hopes for a wider range
- Meeting on Bosnia 1. Today's Principals' Committee meeting will focus on longer-term options for dealing with the Bosnia crisis and whether to extend assurances to NATO that the US--if requested--would commit ground forces to help extricate UNPROFOR from
- on Thursday. Principals thought it would be desirable for you to drop by. 4. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recent Bosnian Serb tactics, CIA, OSD and JCS
- been new NATO airstrikes by the time the meeting takes place. If the UN says the Serbs are in the process of complying, you may be called on to provide an assessment. o Karadzic was most reluctant to agree to withdraw Serb heavy weapons from
- since none of the meeting papers have been received yet. On peace plan implementation, there will be discussions of the political leadership, such as what the role of the UN and NATO should be in any implementation, and the state of consultations
- Meeting on Bosnia You have agreed- to stop by the. Principals Meeting, thank Dick Holbrooke and his team for their efforts, hear a report on where we stand and what we need to accomplish next, and perhaps discuss the NATO air campaign. You could stay
- is to ensure the integrity of military operations, i.e., NATO-led operation, unity of command and no dual key. The Deputies agreed upon the following principles: * Participation in IFOR means acceptance of NATO operational control (OPCON) or tactical control
- to reach a quick and fair settlement on the successor state issues. Also, he would be told not that Serbia is not reforming its economy enough to qualify for assistance. IFOR PLANNING o There was concern that a gap is widening between IFOR planning in NATO
- concern at Thursday's Deputies' meeting that fighting in Bosnia could resume .long before trouble in Croatia, leading to a situation in which US and NATO forces might be evacuating UNPROFOR from both countries. See the MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS TAB
- to prepare a paper for Principals' consideration on Friday, March 3, illustrating the approach Ambassador Holbrooke will use in his meeting with President Tudjman next week. (Action: State) 2. Deputies discussed the issue of Step Two prepositioning of NATO
- and George Joulwan to speed up NATO planning so that you can be briefed on the final OPLAN early next week. That would permit you to make your final decision on U.S. participation and request Congressional support, after which roughly two weeks of intensive
1995-10-25, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia October 25, 1995
(Item)
- ; -- - employ NATO air forces as part of the IFOR; -- employ NATO maritime forces as part of the IFOR. * These missions are subject to review, revision and/or expansion based on the terms of the peace settlement. What is our strategy for avoiding mission
- as "fair" (much less "just") in moral terms. The fundamental problem has been a lack of leverage: - - sanctions and political pressure have been insufficient to sway the Serbs, and our efforts to bring NATO air power to bear have come to naught
- with a possible future British prime minister. tl Probe Blair's thinking on the future of Anglo-American relations under a Labour government. uAssure Blair NATO enlargement will be a gradual, deliberate process that will take Russian sensitivities into account
- Violations 1. Principals discussed the U.S. negotiating team's recommendation that action be taken by NATO against Banja Luka airport in view of the recent increase in Bosnian Serb violations of the no-fly zone. Principals decided to defer a decision pending
1995-05-22, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 23, 1995
(Item)
- ?.-S~CRET C05960886 4. .7 Principals will also consider a number of unanswered policy questions related to implementation of OPLAN 40104. These relate to how the NATO force would respond to various contingencies once it is deployed (for example
- expressions of s and encourage flexibility. We will reaffirm to Izetbegovic ur willingness, through NATO and the UN, to hel implement and our enforce a viable settlement. Influencing the Negotiations Our reporting suggests that Izetbegovic wants an agreement
- enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. They also expressed concern that it would
- now beginning to come in. There appears to have been general agreement to give the Serbs a warning that attacks on Gorazde would be met with strong NATO airstrikes. UK Foreign Secretary Rifkind told a news conference, however, C05960732 -SET SUBJECT
- deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel and indigent population, and to act against gross humanitarian violations where NATO forces are present or have the means and opportunity to act; " IFOR will not be responsible
- crisis of the moment. These issues probably will include what types of threats UNPROFOR would face if it decides to withdraw. what can be done to encourage UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia. how might NATO be drawn into the conflict if it goes in to extricate
- the CSCE is not sufficient to provide a common European defense system. He asserts that NATO is an inappropriate forum for dealing with eastern Europe's security needs, and he has suggested that the Western European Union might be the proper institution
1995-12-12, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia December 12, 1995
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- elements of the UNSCR no later than the day after Paris so that there will be no delay in deployment of the NATO main force. They recognized that highlevel intervention with Allies and the Russians could be necessary in this effort (Action: USUN/State/NSC
- to Eastern Slavonia. State will prepare appropriate messages, including letters and t'alking points to heads of state by COB December 21. 3. Deputies agreed to recommend that the U.S. extend the NATO in extremis extraction commitment from UNCRO
- : What Happened? The Bosnian Army defense of Srebrenica collapsed because of a combination of shortcomings, the light infantry composition of the defenders, a lack of effective material and control, and an underlying reliance on UNPROFOR and NATO to deter
- quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will represent a defeat
- on: OADR C05960753 They agreed that, in light of French opposition to delegating authority for Option 3 air strikes to Janvier, we would agree to defer a NAC decision on the modalities for UN-NATO coordination until the time Option 3 authority was sought
- tempt a veto depending on the country under consideration. 3. PREPARING FOR THE MEETING In particular, you should peruse the following meeting papers.TabsA-Continuation of Air Support beyond the Implementation Program, B--Russian and other-Non-NATO
- between what NATO planners anticipate for IFOR and what is being negotiated. NATO planners seem to be taking a minimalist approach on the mission of the force while the US negotiators seem to be taking a broader approach to the mission which could even
1995-10-27, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia October 27, 1995
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- the authority to act, on the basis of his own judgment, against reported "over the horizon".gross violations of human rights and/or attacks on international civilian agencies, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian needs or attacks, and where NATO
- humanitarian problems loomed on the horizon. He also reported that more than 400 UNPROFOR personnel continue to be detained by the Bosnian Serbs. 3. The Principals agreed that priority must be given to ameliorating strains within NATO that have been exacerbated
- Minister Leotard, we will explore at NATO several options for increasing UNPROFOR's effectiveness: redeploying or reconfiguring UNPROFOR so that it can better defend itself against Serb attacks; opening a humanitarian corridor from the coast to Sarajevo
- from Bosnia and Croatia. They agreed to support NATO discussions with Croatia concerning prepositioning of C3I systems and host nation support for UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia. They further agreed to present to Principals a recommendation
- be circulated NLT OOB Thursday, March 2, for consideration by the Deputies that afternoon. (Action: State with JCS input) 2. Deputies discussed the issue of prepositioning NATO communications assets to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw UNPROFOR from
- an assessment. Leeret C05960254 OPLAN 40104 5. Most of the meeting will be dedicated to the JCS briefing OPLAN 40104-to use NATO to extract UNPROFOR. Depending on how well the briefing goes, the President may be briefed as early as next week
- parties to halt military operations and exercise restraint (I know what The NSC proposes that we consult with you're thinking!). NATO and the UN about the possibility of threatening to use NATO airstrikes against Krajina Serb targets in the event
- now, the USG.has favored a more modest operation. Our concept envisages the deployment of 4,000-5,000 troops composed of forces from a limited number of countries and led by a NATO member. Although a Chapter VII mandate may be necessary-to allow
- e e e e ___ scc: _ Declassify on: A.. GL -PHOTdCOPY RAREPHOTCOIN LINTON LIBRARY Vice President Chief of Staff C06031037 e " " ensuring a clear line of NATO command and control exists for any U.S. lift and/or logistical support
- C06031038 Immediate Congressional consultations will be needed to explain the conditions of our deployment and our exit strategy; we will probably need a supplemental to fund it. Urgent decisions will be required at NATO on command and control, and we
- . They may not move immediately to eliminate the enclaves, however, depending on the military situation elsewhere, NATO threats to use airpower, and the time of year when the UN pulls out. e Over time--probably within six months to a year after a UN pullout
- to Enhance Protection for Deny Flight Missions Based on a CIA assessment.that the current ROE for Deny 5. Flight might note provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light.of recehtly demonstrated Bosnian-Serb tactics, Principals agreed-that CIA
- o r i t y e x i s t s already under SCRs and NAC decisions f o r use of airpower i n support o f UNPROFOR. NATO commanders w i l l UN and use t h a t a u t h o r i t y t o p r o t e c t Gorazde and UNPROFOR [designated Safe Areas] threatened by m
- played a crucial role in many stages of the process of getting this peace initiative organized in the summer since the crisis developed -- and it's important that we cover that -- we want to discuss your role at the end of August when the NATO bombing
- election/visit to Capitol Hill Major calls London Conference NATO Op Plan 40-104 ' Clinton/Christopher/Holbrooke at Chirac White House dinner US promotes air strikes at London Conference Protection of "safe areas" 2 3 3 4 4 4 5,6 Boutros-Ghali hands
- Belgian-Russian contingents, and place control over the Transition Administration in the hands of a U.S. civilian. force w/o U.S. participaton. Such a force Option i. UN- mandated international could consist of NATO and non-NATO elements. There are two
- AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO SECDEF WASHDC NATO EU COLLECTIVE AMEMBASSY BELGRADE AMEMBASSY ZAGREB AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO USDELMC BRUSSELS USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE JOINT STAFF WASHDC C O N F I D E N T 01 OF 03 131650Z OASY-00 I0-00 OIC
- go over them.) In the c a l l s to Major and Chirac, we suggest you also reinforce the points made i n the l e t t e r you sent them over the weekend about the impasse between the UN and NATO commanders over implementation of NATO's new a i r s t r i
- an international, UN, NATO effort. But we will continue to uphold the principles of the London Conference, including the firm denunciation of territorial gains through ethnic cleansing. We will push hard for a better deal for the Muslims. -- The US
- . Lake asked Tarnoff to report back on how we might get more civilian monitors into Kosovo. We should not rule out more US participants. -- No-Fly Enforcement. The group authorized Albright to promote enforcement in New York. -- NATO Guarantees
- with the Allies would leak. Discussion and planning will be done only within the Washington community for now. -- Ambassador Wisner noted that there would be no trouble using NATO for a military operation in Bosnia provided it had a UN umbrella. We
- challenging the UN's control of Sarajevo, particularly since the NATO airstrikes around Gorazde. Initially, Bosnian Serb violations of the 20-kilometer exclusion zone seemed to be an effort to assess the UN's threshold for action. -- The UN troops discovered
- that the US become engaged militarily to help extract UNPROFOR shut SE CRET C05916169 down most humanitarian aid operations, and damage allied confidence in US leadership of NATO. 4. The JCS paper and annexes--see JCS PAPER TAB--lays out four options
- and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia. (Action: JCS/OSD) 4. It was agreed that Sarajevo is important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy as is Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should
- agreed to the following: e The mission of the political implementation mechanism will chiefly be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after the NATO implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY
- NATO airstrikes immediately prior to the fall of Srebrenica. Conversely, a small number of observers may be able to patrol a confrontation line, if they are allowed freedom of movement and there is some reason for the combatants to respect
- pteaentt~ bs~t ae indirect link toth U t1oaivlan overigt, men otnegratins NATO participanta especil Rusig anda credible dinl a m nt)n et~*~ no et emboled in he~litici i Ub E N {ld forcesyiing the Desert Storm iodleL Options fo/ussian R(elationsip
- for draft of the questions and also the MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD in the WEDNESDAY DC tab.] E C)7 2. BACKGROUND. Sandy Berger and the other Deputies are becoming increasingly apprehensive that a disconnect is developing between what NATO planners
1994-12-16, BTF Memorandum re Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia December 19, 1994, 1100-1230
(Item)
- Congressional Support for US Participation in NATO Operations to Withdraw UNPROFOR 7. At the last meeting, the Principals discussed whether to seek Congressional authorization for committing US ground troops to help evacuate UNPROFOR. This commitment was offered
- of Supporting UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Croatia 5. Deputies reviewed the ongoing planning at the UN and NATO regarding UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia. Deputies requested the following work for a follow-up meeting during the week of January 30
- the military perspective. The Military Committee at NATO was working behind the scenes. AFSOUTH is reexamining the plan and may revise the numbers involved in Phase 2 prepositioning. He added that supplying the communications officers for Phase 2 makes
1995-05-04B, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 4, 1995
(Item)
- - Deputies also discussed the importance of warning the 5. Krajina Serbs of the consequences of attacks on U.S. personnel in Zagreb. They.agreed that we should be prepared to bypass the dual-key system if a NATO response were not approved by. the UN
- .' 1 ;z t g _'&c insa-N.eot.esute kac ieerst' rogn , our allies and at the UN, threatening realistic consequences for inaction. - Among our options are the following: -- Using existing authority to permit NATO air activity of the following sorts: 1
- , at its disposal. • The NATO Chiefs of Defense met with UN. Russia, and other Interested nations at The Hague. Netherlands, in December to consider how UNPROFOR could be made more effective. Two initiatives resulted from this meeting: -the formulation
- Gorazde as of last night. This would go well with your Intelligence Update. -- A short information paper--coordinated with DIA-detailing Bosnian Serb air defenses that you might want to pass out if the threat to NATO aircraft comes up for discussion. 4
- unilateral lift even if can stabilize the situation in the short term. - Conditions for success: " Bosnian Serbs decide to negotiate rather than continue military campaign because * GOBH forces are getting stronger, . Use of force by NATO is/will reduce
- and operational timing, Deputies identified several unresolved issues regarding mission creep, use of force, zones of separation, end states, required Presidential decisions, and the coordination of U.S. policy, negotiations, NATO decisions and military planning
- . None of the parties can match a NATO-led force operating under rules of engagement that allow all necessary means to enforce the Plan. Under such circumstances, assuming early challenges were met with force, fighting would be reduced and humanitarian
- and sustain interdiction efforts over time. A variety of reporting suggests that Bosnian Serb leaders are disdainful of recent UN/NATO military actions, and we believe that a few isolated airstrikes would be insufficient to affect Serb behavior. A credible
- militarily--compelling the Bosnian Gnvrnmin in [ it rm on territorial swap In considering a bolder military approach, the Bosnian appears resigned to the prospect of NATO air strikes Serb leadership and a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal
- the Bosnia crisis has not only exposed the bankruptcy of their polity, but it has also caused serious erosion in the credibility of the NATO alliance and the United Nations. Worse, our continued reluctance to lead an effort to resolve a military crisis
- of demagogues and conservative nationalists. ~} Most governments and political elites in the region want a clear security guarantee from the West, ideally through NATO membership. Our pOlicy thus far has been to assert that NATO enlargement is a question
- of demagogues and conservative nationalists. ~} Most governments and political elites in the region want a clear security guarantee from the West, ideally through NATO membership. Our pOlicy thus far has been to assert that NATO enlargement is a question
- AND SOUTH TEXT: •€ O ' 'P-I D D H f I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368 N JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2,CHAIRMAN, USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR POLAD MINISTER PENNER E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05 TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR
- of success. Current draft does not -nion US, Russian, NATO or IFOR, only an "intenational force." Specific "inion and req u mts could be defined pretty much as we like, since the agrement is so general. If we ar still considedng this option, I will get
- at the Contact Group meeting. " NATO SOFAs. Have AFSOUTH and OSD lawyers here working SOFAs. Have presented to allies and preparing to serve to parties tomorrow. * Military Annex Changes. Faxing separately the proposed changes by B-H Government, Russians
- : _______________________ C05962539 Secra Separately the BSA had obtained secure radio equipment from the FRY and was planning to acquire coaxial cable. The BSA re ortedl was repairing communications facilities in the wake of NATO airstrikes. Likely Transport Methods The type
1995-11-15, Don Kerrick to Tony Lake re Talking Points for Meeting with President Izetbegovic
(Item)
- accept and one that is backed by Contact group, there will be no: -- U.S. forces on the ground, -- NATO implementation, and -- economic aid and reconstruction package. o And, Congress will not approve, nor could we ask for, U.S. program for equip
- SITUATION ROOM _ _ _ _ _ (WE) ~ ~ _ 01.03 '6 8:17 NO. 1146024592 r.... PAGE - Eastern Slavonia 2. Deputies agreed to recommend to the President that he approve an approach to the North Atlantic Council to extend NATO's in extremis commitment
- on short notice following the first NATO air-strikes against Bosnian Serb ground targets around Gorazde. President Clinton attended part of the meeting before leaving to deliver a press statement on the attack. National Security Advisor Lake chaired
- in the Sarajevo region. '3 F ~ < ~ r~ Y ' C05916000 TOP SECRET -- UN troops would have difficulty preventing the Serbs from retaking the heavy weapons without NATO close air support. All of the collection sites are behind Serb lines and each is staffed
1994-09-14, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Principals Committee Review of Bosnia Policy
(Item)
- participating in aspects of NATO's sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.) Declassify T on: OADR 't; 'k6 Vice cChicef President ofstaff IHBMRRMOetPYChief of Staf f ~1cc: ; m
- developed a menu of options for more robust action, including establishment of an exclusion zone, use of close air support, airstrikes against radars that "paint" NATO aircraft over Croatia, h of aircraft over Krajina Serb territory, and striking Udbina
- planning for UNCRO drawdown; .e) NATO inability to enforce the No Fly Zone over Banja Luka; and f) Serb threats to move refugees to Vojvodina and Kosovo. -2. e Deputies agreed: The Lake/Tarnoff team would meet with Holbrooke and Drew in London Sunday
- formulation was not bad, particularly in that he had avoided reference to using the Contact Group plan "as a starting point" for negotiations. 3. The Deputies expressed concern about the lack of progress in securing NATO approval to strengthen UNPROFOR
- for this. _SECRET- C05955831 SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia 25 January 1995 5. The JCS representative briefed the Deputies on progress in planning to withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia. Deputies expressed concern that NATO and UN planners were
- for a third 100-day period. They did agree, however, that we should explore steps necessary for NATO and WEU naval forces to assist in enforcing a pre-verification system on Albanian oil imports, in order to reduce the transshipment of oil to Serbia-Montenegro
- government aircraft or even a limited air defense capability would be very costly. State argued that if NATO air strikes were the equalizer in the pre-PIF era, they should remain so during implementation of a settlement and, if necessary, for a period of time
- to defend the territorialintegrity of the Federation. Classified by Multiple Sources Declassify on OADR DRAFT Mew) (le C05961572 DRAFT ' Assumptions 4h * A peace agreement is negotiated, is implemented by a NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR
1995-05-15A, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia May 16, 1995
(Item)
- 40104. TAB D behind MEETING PAPERS includes a State paper and short OSD summary of key issues associated with deployment of a NATO force to extricate UNPROFOR. OSD proposes that the NATO force have no follow-on mission beyond extricating UNPROFOR
- that the conference got off on the right foot. DC: To bounce back chronologically to the NATO bombing campaign and, specifically, the Tomahawk strike against the targets around Banja Luka in northwest Bosnia on September 10. First of all, it seemed to take some
- Hybrid. Although each contributor to the NATO operation would p.ay most of its own way, we could, through talks with our Allies and the international staff, work to expand to the extent possible the proportion of the NATO operation that can be funded
- enforcing exclusion zones via NATO, and .agreeing that if Bosnian Serb intransigence continues, lifting the arms embargo could become unavoidable. -- If pressured, the United States would agree to give the Serbs anotherw negotiations. W would not let
- of control. This would likely provoke isolated confrontations between the IFOR and local forces from each of the warring parties. The Bosnian Serbs view NATO as anti-Serb. Any perception among the parties that NATO king sides during implementation
- implement them. OSD w i l l c i r c u l a t e terms o f r e f e r e n c e Monday March 1, f o r d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e Working Group t e l e c o n a t 10:00 a.m. Tuesday March 2. 4-S-)— 2. NATO preparations for implementation of a settlement. During
- the mantle of Serb protector in 1994 when he perceived that internationally imposed sanctions were undermining his position in Belgrade. e Likewise, Mladic has altered his military tactics when a credible military threat was posited by UN or NATO forces
1995-11-16A, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia November 16, 1995
(Item)
- the authority to act, on the basis of his own judgment, against reported "over. the horizon" gross violations of human rights and/or attacks on international civilian agencies, in situations of urgent and serious humanitarian needs or attacks, and where NATO
- to develop -more initiatives to get the Iranians out of Bosnia. d. When will the agreement be signed in Paris? (1) Date in December as yet unspecified. (2) C/JCS described the military and political level approvals needed at NATO early this week. Q (3
- implementing the existing accord and hope to sow dissension between the US and French in hopes that changes can be made. l 2 -SEAM C05962598 SECRET 0 Many of the Bosnian Serb leaders have made the point that NATO would not be endangered as long
- administration, as Tudjman has requested; we are trying to find additional NATO countries to reinforce the existing Belgian and Russian battalions as the core of a UN peacekeeping force. SFT :LINT~~e@ P, T1.Y i
- to, achieving such agreement in the United Nations. Lifting the arms embargo would require redefining the no fly zone (NFZ), safe areas, and exclusion zones and the role of NATO in enforcing them. If these were not changed, NATO would become directly engaged
- and the international community probably are approaching another watershed in the Bosnian crisis: -- If the Serbs can be persuaded to accept the Contact Group plan, the UN and NATO will need to get serious about preparing an implementation force. -- In the more
- no longer divert -or deliberately delay vessels containing only arms known to be destined for the Bosnian Government. Vessels containing mixed cargos or arms that present a' threat to NATO forces are exempted. 10RE . C05917036 -SBCRET 3. The NSC
- -paper" on the concept being considered by NATO. 'A joint UK/French/USUN draft was discussed, and Deputies tasked a working group chaired by OSD to revise.the non-paper and provide a cleared version for use in New York that evening, drawing
1995-07-31B, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia August 1, 1995
(Item)
- Balkan Task Force SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, 1 August 1995 1. Tuesday's Principals' Committee meeting, according to Sandy Vershbow, will focus on trying to get NATO to accept "Gorazde-type" conditions for use
- for the last meeting. The DC agenda will include: * the role of non-NATO states--particularly Russia--in any Implementation Force (IFOR); e arms control and equip and training to stabilize the country after a settlement; e a final look at the political
- for Croatia, and required next steps for prepositioning of NATO forces in Croatia. You will not be required to take the lead on any issue or to deliver an intelligence update. -- At the pre-brief, the BTF will provide you with talking points keyed
- . Over the weekend, a probable Serb-fired mortar resulted in 10 deaths, and the number of firing incidents has risen dramatically. Silajdzic called in foreign ambassadors and said that the arms embargo should be lifted if NATO and the UN cannot stop
- execution of its mandate. 5. The Deputies had an inconclusive-discussion of SACEUR's request to issue an Action Request for the enabling and main forces in OPLAN 40104 to be forwarded to NATO. While they agreed that the request went beyond existing
- --is becoming more serious in several enclaves. The UN's suspension of relief convoys through Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb territory--ordered on 25 May as a precaution against retaliation for NATO airstrikes--has increased prospects for significant food TOP
- in Bosnia after US forces are withdrawn. With few exceptions, Allies would be reluctant to go beyond traditional UN "peacekeeping" functions and engage in more aggressive "peace enforcement" missions that might be envisioned under a NATO command structure
- , on the future of UNPROFOR forces-s-could damage allied confidence in Washington's leadership of the NATO alliance. Turkey would be the only NATO ally to support the action. Other alliance partners would object and moveirnmediately to withdraw peacekeeping
- to improve enforcement, * Press the Greek and Italian governments to impose greater control on local companies exporting oil to Albania, and * Seek an expansion of the mission of the Adriatic NATO/WEU Multinational Interception Force (MIF) to include
- involvement in sanctions discussions at UN 17 Christopher/Sacirbey encounter in NY Russian reaction to NATO air campaign - 18 Adm. Boorda's views on protecting NATO 18 troops UN sentiment after Sarajevo shelling Srebrenica photographs 19 20 Holding
- s i s has not o n l y exposed t h e b a n k r u p t c y o f t h e i r p o l i c y , b u t i t has a l s o caused s e r i o u s e r o s i o n i n t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e NATO a l l i a n c e and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . Worse
- Case Implementing the Dayton peace plan's provisions for Sarajevo will be the first and certainly one of the most difficult challenges for the international community and IFOR. It will test the unity of NATO and is likely to help shape attitudes
- , the tools we have applied have varied in response to events and as our priorities have shifted. Since Bihac, we have backed away from attempts to bring NATO air power to bear to enforce UNSC resolutions and pressure the Bosnian Serbs to settle on terms
- , AND RETURN OF REFUGEES. NATO HAS REJECTED SUCH TASKS AS PART OF ITS MANDATE IN BOSNIA. FURTHER, DEPLOYING IFOR TO EASTERN SLAVONIA COULD MEAN THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. TROOPS TO CROATIA AS WELL AS BOSNIA. B.. (C) A NON-UN TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY'WOULD PRESENT
- strategy in Congress and in NATO--now that an agreement has been initialed. Also, there could be some discussion of recruiting volunteers for the International Police Task Force. Another topic that could come up is a Principals' discussion of implementation
1995-12-05, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia December 5, 1995
(Item)
- Chapter VII but that we should defer to the UN and troop contributors on this point. Principals agreed that the U.S. military would be prepared to provide some logistics support on a reimbursable basis. Given the need for additional NATO countries
- throughout Bosniaf UN and NATO personnel reportedly have observed so-caled celebratory fire on several occasions and fire has been directed at personnel and vehicles. into force of the agreement, no large-scale fighting has been reported. Since ent
- participation in the airdrops. The NAC could discuss the issue on Wednesday if the President makes an announcement on Tuesday, with the NATO foreign ministers asked to approve on Friday. -- Mr. Inderfurth reported that the Russians, British, and French have
- the effectiveness of our control of the skies. -- We should create United Nations Protected Enclaves. The creation of United Nations protected enclaves (defended by U.S./NATO/Russian forces under an UNPROFOR label) and supported by U.S. air power will be the only
- again how to press for stricter enforcement of exclusion zones. The US Government has not been very successful so far in winning NATO and especially UN support for this option. C05916199 Indeed, UNPROFOR Commanders De LaPresle and Rose took a very
- and utility situation around Sarajevo, and take a very restrictive approach to aid deliveries. Serbian-Bosnian Serb border becomes more porous. Bosnian Government expects NATO military action to slow the Serbs. UNPROFOR comes under greater attack from Serbs
- , and that Sarajevo had been relying on NATO and UNPROFOR for the defense of the enclaves. While the official's claim that the government was essentially relying on the West for the defense of the enclaves is credible--especially given Sarajevo's marginal capability
- ... g 2 In selling this approach to our Allies, we would point out that, if successful, it would reduce the likelihood that NATO would have to implement the decisive air strikes we have already threatened for the defense of Gorazde as well as similar
- once initial implementation steps are accomplished. These might include initial withdrawal of forces to territorial limits, safe deployment of the NATO implementation force, achievement of specifiedmilestones in tle PIF's peace enforcement mission
- for a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. They agreed to defer further discussion until the Principals receive the JCS briefing on the OPLAN on April 28. At that time, the NSC will determine the process that will be used to finalize answers
- withdraw in one of two circumstances: if the fighting becomes intense or the US pushes unilateral lift. Fuerth said it was impossible to answer the policy questions and answers until after a mission statement is drafted for the NATO extraction force
- , THE MISSION WILL END: UNPROFOR WILL REQUIRE A NATO EXTRACTION. WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE APPROACHING PERHAPS* THE FINAL CRISIS OF THE UNPROFOR MISSION -IN BOSNIA. COMMENT. MENZIES END OF MESSAGE END SECRET SECRET UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case
- them? - What will be Serbia's strategy toward the United States, NATO, and the rest of the international community - Controlling Local Serb Armies. Belgrade will have difficulty bringing local Serb armies under its control. The Yugoslav Army might
- -perceived defiance of the UN and NATO. In our view, however, they are unlikely to immediately challenge the UN and NATO by directly attacking the other UN-declared safe areas, which all have a more substantial UN presence than Gorazde had. Rather, Bosnian
- be replaced by US or NATO troops, according to US diplomats. The Belgians have warned publicly that they will withdraw without a new mandate that satisfies several conditions. According to various sources, these include rules of engagement that allow "vigorous
- and a perceived moderation in Belgrade's policies have improved the chances for pursuing a Kosovo settlement. He told the diplomats that the US should take the lead in helping resolve the Kosovo standoff following the deployment of NATO troops in Bosnia. o
- want to focus on entering NATO and the EC because we see ourselves as Europeans who embrace European values. The Czech ..coW~~ElN'l'I1rL ---:,... ·.,.~_7...~ -7'~\ Declassify on :~y; .'::, L"..L;! .... _ ...L:~ ..· DECLASSIFIED IN PARI PERE.O
- want to focus on entering NATO and the EC because we see ourselves as Europeans who embrace European values. The Czech ..coW~~ElN'l'I1rL ---:,... ·.,.~_7...~ -7'~\ Declassify on :~y; .'::, L"..L;! .... _ ...L:~ ..· DECLASSIFIED IN PARI PERE.O
- , including NATO, according to its senior leadership. It views inclusion in the arms embargo as an unfair hindrance to Slovenia's efforts to escape imprisonment in the Yugoslav "problem." " Slovenia's most pressing needs are for aircraft, air defense systems
- to visit. My staff looking at dates. Will get back to you. NATO Succession: Foreign Minister Claes appears to be the strongest of the candidates actively seeking to succeed Manfred Woerner. His candidacy has not yet, however, been formally declared
- match a NATO-led force operating under rules of engagement that allow all necessary means to enforce the Plan. Under such circumstances, assuming early challenges were met with force, fighting would be reduced and humanitarian problems mitigated
- wants t o secure U.S. b a c k i n g f o r A l b a n i a n membership i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (NATO, EBRD, t h e World Bank, t h e IMF, and t h e EU) and c l o s e r m i l i t a r y and s e c u r i t y cooperation, including
- a n s from t h e i r homes and v i l l a g e s and innocent c i v i l i a n s are being h u r t because he b e l i e v e s , a f t e r t a l k i n g t o Primakov, t h a t there i s not a chance o f a NATO m i l i t a r y response because he t h i n k s
- ) FROM MAURA PELLET. YOU'VE RECEIVED AN INVITE FROM HOLBROOKE FOR A THURSDAY DEC 8 MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS NATO EXPANSION STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY HENRY KISSINGER. I SPOKE WITH DAN HAMILTON IN EUR, WHO CONFIRMS THAT HOLBROOKE PLANS
- with superior organization and firepower, many Bosnian defenders probably opted to fade into the hills and try to get to friendly lines. * Perhaps most importantly, Government leaders in the enclave probably were counting on the UN or NATO to do something
1995-10-24B, Office of the Vice President, National Security Advisor Memo re Sanctions Relief
(Item)
- to ensure a stable military situation after IFOR withdraws, and/or . National elections. Lifting sanctions before IFOR's departure surrenders sanctions leverage while NATO troops are still on the ground, thus reducing options for deterring Serb threats
1995-03-27, Office of the Vice President, National Security Advisor Memorandum re Sanctions Policy
(Item)
- the EU to join in pressing Italy and Greece to control oil shipments to Albania through a pre-verification system that allows shipments to legitimate Albanian end users only. * Jointly-press Albania to do a better job. e Have the NATO-WEU force (SHARP
- FOR SUCCESS. HE ADDED THAT PUTIN FEARS NEITHER THE U.S. NOR NATO, BUT THINKS THE U.S. HOLDS POSITIONS THAT RUN COUNTER TO RUSSIAN INTERESTS. PICKERING NOTED THAT, WHILE YELTSIN HAD A CLEAR STRATEGY BUT WAS CONFUSED ON TACTICS, PUTIN WAS AT THE MOMENT
- to the UNPROFOR headquarters), journalists, and relief workers, are in the city. Two proposals have been made for breaking this siege: the Western European Union's "Safe Haven Sarajevo" document and the Vance/Owen plan's Draft Military Accord. Inaddition, NATO
- their capital as a place for the allies to meet, July 21st. We UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 6 talk about sort of renewed NATO effort. Do you remember any ways that you were involved in the preparations going into London, particularly the formulation of US
- . -- The new resolution authorized the interdiction of vessels, suspected of violating sanctions, in.the Adriatic Sea. NATO and WEU forces there have. reportedly boarded close to 200 ships to date. The riparian states are to stop illicit shipments via
- not, however, defend the eastern enclaves. After a UN withdrawal, the government would quickly push for lifting the arms embargo and make calls for NATO intervention, but would continue to rely on their own forces to achieve their goals in Bosnia. Bosnian
- , equipped, and trained for guerrilla warfare. As a C00372340 NATO or Soviet air forces, the Air Force has ground attack capabilities that could be effective in a civil war. Territorial Defense Forces Despite repeated efforts by Belgrade in recent months
- session of a working group on Afghanistan agreed at the Moscow summit. Tom Pickering and former SVR Director (and present Deputy Foreign Minister) Trubnikov will lead. On NATO-Russia, we want to send a signal that Putin's interest in closer cooperation has
- be portrayed as capitulation to NATO, have linked the two tracks, and are using our desire for quick agreement as leverage for achieving a better deal on the long-term structure (Track IDAttachment Tab A Points to Make in Call to Yeltsin -SECRET•SECRET
